Managerial Overconfidence and the Discretionary Recognition of Deferred Tax Assets
- 문서 유형
- 연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
- 등재
- KCI
- 저널 순위
- KCI Q3
- 저널
- 세무회계연구pp.325 · 2026
- 피인용
- KCI 0
- ISSN
- 1226-1947
저자
- 지상현제1저자부산대학교
- 양해면교신저자호원대학교
초록
[Purpose]This study examines whether managerial overconfidence affects the discretionary recognition of deferred tax assets (DTAs) and whether corporate governance moderates this relationship. [Methodology]Using 1,878 firm-year observations of Korean listed firms from 2017 to 2020, managerial overconfidence is measured based on firms’ capital expenditure behavior, while discretionary deferred tax asset recognition is estimated using the residuals from a deferred tax asset valuation model. [Findings]The results indicate that managerial overconfidence is positively associated with the discretionary recognition of deferred tax assets, suggesting that overconfident managers tend to assess the realizability of deferred tax assets more optimistically. Furthermore, this positive relationship is significant only among firms with weak corporate governance and disappears among firms with strong corporate governance. These findings imply that effective governance mechanisms can mitigate the influence of managerial overconfidence on accounting judgments. [Implications]This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that managerial behavioral characteristics affect deferred tax asset recognition and by demonstrating the monitoring role of corporate governance in constraining managerial discretion. The findings also provide useful implications for investors, auditors, and regulators in evaluating the reliability of deferred tax asset recognition.
키워드
Managerial OverconfidenceDeferred Tax AssetsDiscretionary RecognitionCorporate Governance
식별자
- KCI
- ART003362079



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