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Cross-ownership and endogenous managerial delegation in Bertrand competition

문서 유형
연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
등재
ScopusSSCI
저널 순위
JCR Q2Scopus Q3
저널
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS147(1) · 2026
피인용
Web of Science 0Scopus 0
FWCI (Scopus)
0
JCR IF
JCR 2024 1.7
ISSN
0931-8658

저자

  1. 최강식제1저자교신저자Pusan Natl Univ, Grad Sch Int Studies, Busandaehak Ro 63 Beon Gil 2, Busan 46241, South Korea

초록

This study analyzes the effects of cross-ownership on endogenous managerial delegation in Bertrand competition, where one firm holds shares in a rival firm. We assume that the firm fully owned by its shareholder (the full-ownership firm) has no control over the output decisions of the other firm, which is jointly owned by two shareholders (the joint-ownership firm). Under high cross-ownership, the full-ownership firm chooses not to implement a managerial delegation contract, whereas the joint-ownership firm chooses delegation, resulting in asymmetric delegation. Conversely, under low cross-ownership, both firms have incentives to choose delegation strategies, leading to symmetric delegation. We find that social welfare and consumer surplus are higher under the equilibrium with asymmetric delegation than under symmetric delegation. Additionally, producer surplus is inversely related to total output. These results imply that asymmetric delegation enhances Pareto efficiency for social welfare, whereas symmetric delegation leads to Pareto efficiency for the firms.

키워드

Asymmetric delegationBertrandCross-ownershipSocial welfare

식별자

Scopus EID
2-s2.0-105024700959
WoS UID
001640541700001