Cross-ownership and endogenous managerial delegation in Bertrand competition
- 문서 유형
- 연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
- 등재
- ScopusSSCI
- 저널 순위
- JCR Q2Scopus Q3
- 저널
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS147(1) · 2026
- 피인용
- Web of Science 0Scopus 0
- FWCI (Scopus)
- 0
- JCR IF
- JCR 2024 1.7
- ISSN
- 0931-8658
저자
- 최강식제1저자교신저자Pusan Natl Univ, Grad Sch Int Studies, Busandaehak Ro 63 Beon Gil 2, Busan 46241, South Korea
초록
This study analyzes the effects of cross-ownership on endogenous managerial delegation in Bertrand competition, where one firm holds shares in a rival firm. We assume that the firm fully owned by its shareholder (the full-ownership firm) has no control over the output decisions of the other firm, which is jointly owned by two shareholders (the joint-ownership firm). Under high cross-ownership, the full-ownership firm chooses not to implement a managerial delegation contract, whereas the joint-ownership firm chooses delegation, resulting in asymmetric delegation. Conversely, under low cross-ownership, both firms have incentives to choose delegation strategies, leading to symmetric delegation. We find that social welfare and consumer surplus are higher under the equilibrium with asymmetric delegation than under symmetric delegation. Additionally, producer surplus is inversely related to total output. These results imply that asymmetric delegation enhances Pareto efficiency for social welfare, whereas symmetric delegation leads to Pareto efficiency for the firms.
키워드
식별자
- Scopus EID
- 2-s2.0-105024700959
- WoS UID
- 001640541700001



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