Strategic delegation and network externalities under export rivalry market
- 문서 유형
- 연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
- 등재
- ScopusSSCI
- 저널 순위
- JCR Q4Scopus Q3
- 저널
- MANCHESTER SCHOOL90(1) · pp.1 · 2022
- 피인용
- Web of Science 3Scopus 6
- FWCI (Scopus)
- 0.38
- JCR IF
- JCR 2021 1.063
- ISSN
- 1463-6786
저자
- 최강식제1저자Pusan Natl Univ, Grad Sch Int Studies, Pusan, South Korea
- Lee, Ki-Dong교신저자Keimyung Univ, Fac Econ & Commerce, 1095 Dalgubeol Daero, Daegu 42601, South Korea
초록
In the presence of network externalities, this study examines the endogenous delegation structure in an export rivalry market with import tariff under Bertrand competition. Contrast to previous works, we show that (i) with strong (weak) network externalities, choosing delegation for exporters is a dominant strategy, which implies the managerial delegation for output expansion (restriction) is socially desirable; (ii) with intermediate network externalities, the exporters choose no delegation in equilibrium; (iii) compared to no delegation, a smaller import tariff further increases both exporters incentives, consumer surplus and social welfare to choose delegation for output expansion unless the strength of network externalities is small; and (iv) hence, two contrasting prisoner's dilemmas occur in the Bertrand competition when the network effect is medium-sized.
키워드
Bertranddelegationimport tariffnetwork externalitiesMAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFSOPTIMUM-WELFARETRADECOMPETITIONBERTRAND
식별자
- Scopus EID
- 2-s2.0-85113385511
- WoS UID
- 000688459900001



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