The efficiency of competing vertical chains with network externalities
- 문서 유형
- 연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
- 등재
- ScopusSSCI
- 저널 순위
- JCR Q4Scopus Q2
- 저널
- ECONOMICS LETTERS168 · pp.1 · 2018
- 피인용
- Web of Science 10Scopus 10
- FWCI (Scopus)
- 0.38
- JCR IF
- JCR 2017 0.581
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
저자
- Lee, DongJoon제1저자Faculty of Commerce, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Aichi, Japan
- 최강식교신저자Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Pusan, South Korea
초록
This paper compares vertical integration and vertical separation with network externalities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, if network effects are stronger than the threshold level of the network externality parameter, manufacturers' strategic choices of wholesale prices move in opposite directions (i.e., wholesale prices may be strategic substitutes under Bertrand competition). Second, if the strength of network effects is strong enough, both profits and outputs are larger under vertical separation than under integration. Finally, if network effects are strong (weak), outputs (wholesale prices, retail prices), consumer surplus, and social welfare are higher (lower) under separation than integration. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
키워드
Network effectsCompetition effectsStrategic substitutesPRODUCERS COMPETITIONDELEGATIONCOMPATIBILITYSEPARATIONRESTRAINTSECONOMICSPRICE
식별자
- Scopus EID
- 2-s2.0-85044990903
- WoS UID
- 000438479700001



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