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The efficiency of competing vertical chains with network externalities

문서 유형
연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
등재
ScopusSSCI
저널 순위
JCR Q4Scopus Q2
저널
ECONOMICS LETTERS168 · pp.1 · 2018
피인용
Web of Science 10Scopus 10
FWCI (Scopus)
0.38
JCR IF
JCR 2017 0.581
ISSN
0165-1765

저자

  1. Lee, DongJoon제1저자Faculty of Commerce, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Aichi, Japan
  2. 최강식교신저자Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Pusan, South Korea

초록

This paper compares vertical integration and vertical separation with network externalities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, if network effects are stronger than the threshold level of the network externality parameter, manufacturers' strategic choices of wholesale prices move in opposite directions (i.e., wholesale prices may be strategic substitutes under Bertrand competition). Second, if the strength of network effects is strong enough, both profits and outputs are larger under vertical separation than under integration. Finally, if network effects are strong (weak), outputs (wholesale prices, retail prices), consumer surplus, and social welfare are higher (lower) under separation than integration. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

키워드

Network effectsCompetition effectsStrategic substitutesPRODUCERS COMPETITIONDELEGATIONCOMPATIBILITYSEPARATIONRESTRAINTSECONOMICSPRICE

식별자

Scopus EID
2-s2.0-85044990903
WoS UID
000438479700001