Peer Pressure with Inequity Aversion
- 문서 유형
- 연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
- 등재
- KCIScopusSSCI
- 저널 순위
- JCR Q4Scopus Q4
- 저널
- Korean Economic Review34(2) · pp.131 · 2018
- 피인용
- Web of Science 0Scopus 0KCI 0
- FWCI (Scopus)
- 0
- JCR IF
- JCR 2017 0.31
- ISSN
- 0254-3737
저자
- 최강식제1저자Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Pusan, South Korea
- Han, Jae-Joon교신저자Department of Global Finance and Banking, Inha University, Incheon, South Korea
- Lee, MinhwanDepartment of Global Finance and Banking, Inha University, Incheon, South Korea
초록
To examine the effects of peer pressure on outputs under symmetric and asymmetric information, we define a peer pressure function representing psychological costs and incorporate it into the agent's utility function. Under symmetric information, an efficient agent who is averse to inequity (i.e., suffering from being ahead) produces less than he does without peer pressure whereas an inefficient agent suffering from being behind produces more such that the output gap between the two types of agents is lessened. Moreover, overproduction in total output will occur if the inefficient agent's disadvantage inequity aversion is greater than that of the efficient agent's. However, as the information structure becomes asymmetric, the overproduction disappears because the information rent paid to the efficient agent becomes too burdensome so that it countervails the active peer pressure effect. These results are consistent with previous findings from empirical and experimental studies.
키워드
First Peer PressureInequity AversionAdverse SelectionTotal OutputTrade-offINCENTIVESCOMPETITIONWORKPLACETEAMS
식별자
- Scopus EID
- 2-s2.0-85059232714
- WoS UID
- 000437388100002
- KCI
- ART002360792



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