Envy and pricing of quality in adverse selection
- 문서 유형
- 연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
- 등재
- ScopusSSCI
- 저널 순위
- JCR Q3Scopus Q3
- 저널
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS106(1) · pp.27 · 2012
- 피인용
- Web of Science 0
- JCR IF
- JCR 2011 0.581
- ISSN
- 0931-8658
저자
- 최강식제1저자부산대학교, 국제전문대학원, 국제통상전공, KO
초록
The paper analyzes the optimal pricing of quality when consumers feel envious of other purchase deals. The influence of envy on the optimal pricing of quality varies depending on whether consumers are concerned about envy in payments or in rents. If consumers compare their payments with those of other consumers, the firm has an incentive to produce lower quality than the first-best level for the high valuation consumer and higher quality than the second-best level for the low valuation consumer. Conversely, when consumers' disutility from envy arises from envy in rents, the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction becomes more serious than in the situation where there is no envy.
키워드
EnvyPricing of qualityTrade-offCONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTIONGOODSPRODUCT
식별자
- WoS UID
- 000303474000002



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