Unions, government's preference, and privatization
- 문서 유형
- 연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
- 등재
- ScopusSSCI
- 저널 순위
- JCR Q3
- 저널
- ECONOMIC MODELLING28(6) · pp.2502 · 2011
- 피인용
- Web of Science 5
- JCR IF
- JCR 2010 0.601
- ISSN
- 0264-9993
저자
- 최강식제1저자교신저자Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, South Korea
초록
By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of unionized mixed oligopolies, this study investigates the efficiency of privatization. The results are twofold. First, regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues and the number of private firms, the government and the public firm do not always have an incentive to privatize the public firm even if the government places lesser emphasis on the tax revenues than on social welfare. Second, social welfare increases with an increased number of private firms regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues and decreases with the government's preference for tax revenues regardless of the number of private firms. Hence, the government can use tax more efficiently as a commitment device to control the union's wage demand so as to maintain lower wage level under unionized mixed oligopoly. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
키워드
UnionGovernment's preferenceSocial welfareTaxPrivatizationMIXED OLIGOPOLYLEVIATHANPRIVATISATIONWAGESFIRMS
식별자
- WoS UID
- 000298070200019



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