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Unions, government's preference, and privatization

문서 유형
연구출판물 · 학술지 논문
등재
ScopusSSCI
저널 순위
JCR Q3
저널
ECONOMIC MODELLING28(6) · pp.2502 · 2011
피인용
Web of Science 5
JCR IF
JCR 2010 0.601
ISSN
0264-9993

저자

  1. 최강식제1저자교신저자Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, South Korea

초록

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of unionized mixed oligopolies, this study investigates the efficiency of privatization. The results are twofold. First, regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues and the number of private firms, the government and the public firm do not always have an incentive to privatize the public firm even if the government places lesser emphasis on the tax revenues than on social welfare. Second, social welfare increases with an increased number of private firms regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues and decreases with the government's preference for tax revenues regardless of the number of private firms. Hence, the government can use tax more efficiently as a commitment device to control the union's wage demand so as to maintain lower wage level under unionized mixed oligopoly. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

키워드

UnionGovernment's preferenceSocial welfareTaxPrivatizationMIXED OLIGOPOLYLEVIATHANPRIVATISATIONWAGESFIRMS

식별자

WoS UID
000298070200019