Skip to content

The efficiency of competing vertical chains with network externalities

Document Type
Publications · Journal Article
Registered DB
ScopusSSCI
Journal Ranking
JCR Q4Scopus Q2
Journal
ECONOMICS LETTERS168 · pp.1 · 2018
Citation
Web of Science 10Scopus 10
FWCI (Scopus)
0.38
JCR IF
JCR 2017 0.581
ISSN
0165-1765

Authors

  1. Lee, DongJoonFirst authorFaculty of Commerce, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Aichi, Japan
  2. Choi, KangsikCorresponding authorGraduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Pusan, South Korea

Abstract

This paper compares vertical integration and vertical separation with network externalities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, if network effects are stronger than the threshold level of the network externality parameter, manufacturers' strategic choices of wholesale prices move in opposite directions (i.e., wholesale prices may be strategic substitutes under Bertrand competition). Second, if the strength of network effects is strong enough, both profits and outputs are larger under vertical separation than under integration. Finally, if network effects are strong (weak), outputs (wholesale prices, retail prices), consumer surplus, and social welfare are higher (lower) under separation than integration. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords

Network effectsCompetition effectsStrategic substitutesPRODUCERS COMPETITIONDELEGATIONCOMPATIBILITYSEPARATIONRESTRAINTSECONOMICSPRICE

Identifiers

Scopus EID
2-s2.0-85044990903
WoS UID
000438479700001