The efficiency of competing vertical chains with network externalities
- Document Type
- Publications · Journal Article
- Registered DB
- ScopusSSCI
- Journal Ranking
- JCR Q4Scopus Q2
- Journal
- ECONOMICS LETTERS168 · pp.1 · 2018
- Citation
- Web of Science 10Scopus 10
- FWCI (Scopus)
- 0.38
- JCR IF
- JCR 2017 0.581
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
Authors
- Lee, DongJoonFirst authorFaculty of Commerce, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Aichi, Japan
- Choi, KangsikCorresponding authorGraduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Pusan, South Korea
Abstract
This paper compares vertical integration and vertical separation with network externalities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, if network effects are stronger than the threshold level of the network externality parameter, manufacturers' strategic choices of wholesale prices move in opposite directions (i.e., wholesale prices may be strategic substitutes under Bertrand competition). Second, if the strength of network effects is strong enough, both profits and outputs are larger under vertical separation than under integration. Finally, if network effects are strong (weak), outputs (wholesale prices, retail prices), consumer surplus, and social welfare are higher (lower) under separation than integration. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords
Network effectsCompetition effectsStrategic substitutesPRODUCERS COMPETITIONDELEGATIONCOMPATIBILITYSEPARATIONRESTRAINTSECONOMICSPRICE
Identifiers
- Scopus EID
- 2-s2.0-85044990903
- WoS UID
- 000438479700001



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